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REFORM CONSPIRACY: 


A. LETTER 


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ADDRESSED 


TO BRADLEY T. JOHNSON, ESQ., OF FREDERICK, /?/ ' L 

By E. W. BELT, Esq. 


“It were good, therefore, that men, in their innovations, would follow the example of Time 

itself, which indeed innovateth greatly, but quietly, and by degrees scarce to be perceived. 

“ It is good also not to try experiments in States, except the necessity be urgent, or the utility 
evident; and well to beware that it be the reformation that draweth on the change, and not.,the 
desire of change that pretendelh the reformation.”— Bacon. 


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BALTIMORE: 

PRINTED BY SHERWOOD &.CO. 

N. W. CORNER BALTIMORE AND GAY STREETS. 


1858 










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THE REFORM CONSPIRACY. 


Upper Marlborough, Md. 
May 1st, 1858. 


} 


Bradley T. Johnson, Esq. 

Sir,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
recent favor, in which, on behalf of yourself and others who 
oppose the present “Reform Conspiracy” movement in this 
State, you request a publication of the remarks made by me 
in the House of Delegates of Maryland, on the 2d day of 
March last, in opposition to the bill then pending, directing 
the sense of the people to he taken upon the expediency of 
calling a convention to reform the existing constitution; and 
I am under obligation for the compliment conveyed in the 
expression you give of the belief of yourself and others, that 
such publication would, in some degree, serve to bring prop¬ 
erly before the people the illegal character of the movement 
at this time, and its very questionable propriety even as a 
matter of policy. It is rendered impossible for me to comply 
with your request, for the reasons that I did not preserve any 
record of the remarks you refer to, and that I have neither 
such memoranda, nor so perfect a recollection of them, as 
would justify their publication at this time in the form sug¬ 
gested. 

The measure was very warmly and earnestly opposed in 
both houses, and called forth an expression of views from 
several gentlemen with whom I was associated, in the mi¬ 
nority, that must have clearly demonstrated its unconstitu¬ 
tionality and impolicy, if its passage had not been precon¬ 
certed as a matter of party necessity by the. majority, and 
enforced by the ordinary appliances of party discipline. The 
view which I had the honor to present was hardly more .than 
an humble auxiliary to the arguments of others to which I 
refer; but the examination of the question I was led to make 
confirmed in me so strong a conviction that we were justified 
in our course by the truth of the positions we ^ssumed, that 
I have the less hesitation in complying with your alternative 
request, to set down the considerations of law and of policy 



4 


upon which we resisted the passage of the hill, and to note 
those inferences against its adoption by the people that may 
be fairly and properly drawn from the circumstances that at¬ 
tended its passage. This I will endeavor to do in as brief a 
space as may be—trusting to your forbearance for the incom¬ 
pleteness that must necessarily attend an attempt to develop 
so extensive a subject in this hurried manner, and relying 
more upon the inherent truth of the propositions to be ad¬ 
vanced than upon the clearness or force of their exposi¬ 
tion. And in order to the accomplishment of my purpose 
Avith any degree of satisfaction, it will be necessary to notice 
(1,) the illegality of the late Reform Bill, arising from the 
want of constitutional power in the Legislature to enact it; 
(2,) its entire impolicy at this time, owing to the absence of 
any public necessity or popular demand for its passage; (3,) 
the circumstances of its origin and enactment that are justly' 
calculated to excite suspicion as to its purposes; and (4,) the 
real objects and designs which underlie the whole movement, 
and which have caused it to be thus suddenly thrust upon 
the people of the State. 

I. According to our American theory, that fundamental 
capacity of power which is common^ termed Sovereignty is 
vested originally only in the people, and remains in them at 
all times ; though the right of exercising some of its functions 
may be temporarily vested in their agents. We are accus¬ 
tomed to look to no other quarter for the source of rightful 
sovereign power than to the whole body of the people who 
compose the community; and in them rests rightfully every 
function, the exercise of which the term sovereignty implies. 
From them alone proceeds, primarily, the exercise by indi¬ 
viduals or bodies of any such function, and to them alone, as 
to the source of power, can the rightful wielding of such 
function be referred for its just authority. “No man,” says 
Mr. Webster, “makes a question that the people are the 
source of all political power/' And the same indisputable 
truth is recognized in equally strong terms by Chief Justice 
Taney, in the great Rhode Island case, (7 Howard ,) where 
he remarks that “ no one has ever doubted the proposition 
that, according to the institutions of this country, the sover¬ 
eignty in every State resides in the people of the State." It 
is, in fact, the first axiom of our constitutional law and po¬ 
litical philosophy. 

Sovereignty being thus in the people, and all political 
power being*theirs of right, it follows of course that they 
have the undoubted power of establishing a government for 
their own welfare as a community. And it would seem 


5 


equally clear, if we preserve the idea of the people, as distinct 
from their agents, that the former have the power and the 
right, at any and all times, to alter, amend, change or abol¬ 
ish their form of government at their own pleasure. This, 
indeed, seems to be included in the power of forming 
government at all; and it is affirmed by the jurist just 
named, in the continuation of the sentence already partially 
quoted, when he adds the words, “and that they ( the people) 
may alter and change their form of government at their own 
pleasure/' It is obvious, further, from the very nature of 
this power of change, that it is one that must necessarily 
continue in the people at all times and under all circum¬ 
stances ; and that though it may be delegated, transferred 
or surrendered by them at times for their own conve¬ 
nience, they may at pleasure resume it for the execution of 
their own purposes. For it cannot be denied that, in the ex¬ 
ercise of its high original powers, the will of the sovereignty 
is a law unto itself. It would hence also appear that the 
people , as such, always retain the right of making such 
changes by their awn motion , notwithstanding the power of 
directing them maybe transferred and themselves be limited 
by their own act; but it is necessary that, in asserting this 
doctrine, we should have in view exclusively the people, 'as 
distinguished from the representatives of the people, and 
that we should not confuse the indefinable power of the one 
with the narrow privileges of the other. Keeping in view 
this distinction, it is safe to say that the people, at all times, 
may alter their form of government—provided the alteration 
be instituted, called for and carried out by the people, acting 
as such, in their sovereign capacity. What distinction, if 
any, exists between this ultimate and continuing power of 
the people and what is generally termed the “ right of revo¬ 
lution," it may not be pertinent to inquire. The latter 
phrase may be a rough statement of the inalienable power 
of change that resides in the people. It is a doctrine admir¬ 
ably set forth, at great length and with much clearness, in 
the learned opinion of Mr. Justice Woodbury in the case al¬ 
ready cited ; and, indeed, it may be remarked that the spirit 
of the decision in that case seems fully to justify the position 
taken, when it settles that the legality of a change of gov¬ 
ernment, contrary to the forms of law, is a question for the 
political power only , and is to be determined in that forum. 
At any rate, this doctrine is now availed of by the friends of 
the pending reform movement in Maryland f to justify its 
political rectitude —singularly enough, indeed, considering 
that it is a principle they have all their lives been opposing 


6 


and denouncing. But so far from silencing tlie opponents of 
this reform business, as they seem to think it should do, it is 
a doctrine which we can admit to its fullest extent, and still 
insist upon the absolute illegality of the present movement. 
Indeed, the truth of this principle will, in a great degree, if 
proper distinctions be observed, serve to elucidate the un¬ 
tenable grounds on which the legality of that movement is 
based. 

It has been, made a question, whether the people can be¬ 
come limited in the exercise of their sovereign functions or 
rights ; and the inquiry is connected with, though not strict¬ 
ly essential to, the present argument. Unquestionably, sov¬ 
ereignty can experience no restraint, aliunde —no external 
power can restrain its capacity. But can the sovereignty 
restrict itself—limit itself as to the mode in which, it will ex¬ 
ercise its powers, in such a manner as that the limitations 
shall become a law even unto the sovereignty ? This point 
is often suggested as to the validity of those constitutional 
provisions, very frequent in our American law, by which 
changes are sought to be prevented for ascertain prescribed 
period. In reference to which it may be made a question 
whether, in the very act of establishing government itself, 
the sovereignty does not limit itself by its own action ? If 
sovereignty be a law unto itself, may it not prescribe the 
method of its own action ? May not the sovereign power, in 
the exercise of its own free will, though uninfluenced by ex¬ 
traneous control, of its own motion impose upon itself any 
modes or limitations it may seefit, which shall control its 
movements? It might be added, indeed, that the power of 
self-limitation is implied in the idea of unlimited power. 
Certainly the power that can establish an organism hath 
ability to change the same—but should we not detract from 
the fulness of that power by saying it is not potent enough 
to prescribe the rules for its own action ? Is not a denial of 
the power of self-limitation in derogation of the idea we 
have of the nature of sovereignty itself? Independently of 
the capacity of change, it is obviously true that all govern¬ 
ment is restrictive ; that sovereignty necessarily becomes 
limited in the establishment of any form of rule. And as 
for the restriction on the right to change, is it any more re¬ 
strictive than any other principle embodied in a government? 
The establishment of an executive—a judiciary—a legisla¬ 
ture, to exist in certain forms and none other, do not appear 
to be essentially any less of the nature of limitations on 
sovereignty, than the establishment of a restrictive clause 
defining how long the government shall last and how it may 


7 


be changed. And it is certain that the mere duration pre¬ 
scribed, as the bounds of alteration, is no more a limitation 
than the manner laid down for effecting such change—a truth 
that appears to be lost sight of somewhat in the argumenta¬ 
tion of our latter-day reformers. 

But be this as it may. It may or may not be true, ab¬ 
stractly, that the people can limit themselves. If it be : then, 
in the light of the plain limitations contained iti the present 
constitution, there is an end of the argument—for they un¬ 
doubtedly have therein placed a restraint upon themselves as 
to the time and method of altering that instrument. In the 
Bill of Bights, Article 1, it is thus written: 

“ That all government of right originates from the people, is founded 
in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole; and 
they have, at all times, according to the mode prescribed in this con¬ 
stitution, the inalienable right to alter, reform, or abolish their form 
of government in such manner as they may deem expedient 

And the 43d article of the same is as follows: 

“That this Constitution shall not be altered, changed or abolished 
except in the manner therein prescribed and directed ” 

Which clauses are followed up in the Constitution itself by 
the prescription of a mode of change, that is laid down in 
Article XI. 

If, we say, it be generally true that the people can limit t 
themselves at all, or lay down to themselves any binding rule \* 
of action, then the above clauses at once establish the ille- l 
gality of the present Reform movement. But as there seems \ 
to be no reason a priori why the people may not limit them- \ 
selves if they see tit; and as it is clear that government it- I 
self is originally a limitation; as it is equally clear that this » 
self-limitation is continually seen in our American polity; 
as it is apparent that the people meant and intended to bind 
themselves in this regard; and as it does not appear that the 
above restrictions are any more of the nature of limitations 
than any other clauses in the Constitution , it seems to follow at 
the very least that they are just as valid, and just as binding 
on the people, as any other clauses whatever. Certainly we 
may claim this: that these limitations on the power of 
change are legal and binding and of full force and virtue, 
until they shall be mdlified by the only poioer having the right to 
nullify them , to wit, the People themselves. They have chosen 
to put these clauses in their organic law. We must suppose 
they designed them to have effect; and further that they re¬ 
main satisfied with their operation, until they give evidence 




8 

of their discontent. It matters not whether these clauses in 
fact conclude the people or not, nor whether they take away 
the power to change. We have admitted above, to the full¬ 
est extent, the entire power of the people, even against their 
self-imposed law, to change the government in respect of its 
duration. They have the same power in respect of any other 
feature of the government—of the judiciary or legislature, for 
example, or rather the clauses establishing these departments. 
They are as absolutely unlimited in regard to one as the 
others of the many limitations which the Constitution con¬ 
tains. They may rise and alter them at any time. But it 
seems conclusively to follow that until they shall, as the peo¬ 
ple, by their own motion, exercise their rights in the premises, 
it is to be presumed that they wish to remain in obedience to 
the law which they have imposed upon themselves—and this 
as well in reference to the clause concerning amendments as 
any other clause in the Constitution. In other words, al¬ 
though each article of the Constitution is only binding on 
the people at their own will , still it can only be altered by 
their will and their own motion; although the people, as such, 
may at any time change any feature of their organic law, still 
it remains law until the people exercise the power. It cer¬ 
tainly cannot be pretended that any mere agent of the people, 
any mere creature of the Constitution, unless expressly au¬ 
thorized, can, by its will, without any exhibition of the wishes 
# of the people, undertake to do that the doing of which is the 
. highest attribute of the people’s sovereignty. These consid¬ 
erations appear to remove the apparent conflict between the 
enlarged power of the people that has been conceded, and the 
limitations which they have obviously placed upon them- 
j selves. 

/ Now it is not contended that this present Reform move¬ 
ment is one pxxY<i\y popular. Its originators, in order to justify 
it, as has been before remarked, are driven, it is true, to an 
assertion of the power of the people above admitted. But it 
cannot be shown that the people have, in any manner 
whatever, indicated their wish or intention to exercise that 
power. The movement does not proceed from the people, is 
not conducted by them, and was not warranted by their 
authority. All that it depends upon, all that has set it in 
motion, is an Act of Assembly passed at the recent session of 
the Legislature. And this brings us at once to the con¬ 
siderations on which alone, in the present phase of the 
movement, its legality can be discussed; for we can only 
decide at this time upon the validity or invalidity of the 
movement, as we may determine whether or no it lay within 


9 


the Constitutional competency of the General Assembly to 
pass the hill referred to. 

Granting then the power of the people, as before allowed, 
upon what grounds can it be maintained that the Legislature 
can take a step towards changing the Constitution? For it 
is certainly unquestionable that to whatever extent the 
limitations in the Bill of Eights heretofore quoted may bind 
the people, they are perfectly valid to bind the agents of the 
people. The legislature is a creature of the Constitution, and 
derives its powers from it, and is subject in all particulars to 
the limitations thrown around it in that instrument. In the 
first place then, before inquiring into the nature of these 
limitations, in a general way we may ask:—Who has 
authority, in the name of the sovereignty, to institute meas¬ 
ures for the overthrow of the Constitution adopted by the 
sovereignty as its organic and supreme rule? Who can take 
the initiative in such movement? We are told the Legis¬ 
lature may—it being representative of the people. But 
has the will of the sovereignty ever been expressed through 
the Legislature, or can it be ? Even taking it for granted, 
that a majority of th q people constitute the sovereignty, may 
not a majority of the Legislature be of a different view from 
a popular majority, and so not represent it at all ? Heavy 
majorities in some places for one party, slight majorities in 
many others against the same, &c., may and do often cause 
the popular majority to be quite the other way from the 
majority of those elected—as is sometimes the case in Presi¬ 
dential contests, (and almost always so in the election of a 
Congress,) where an electoral preponderance does not neces¬ 
sarily presuppose a popular majority. The Legislature is 
not, therefore, a representative of sovereignty, save under 
its own rule and in its own sphere, which sovereignty has 
beforehand prescribed for it. It has no power over the Con¬ 
stitution—and none under it save what is therein written 
for it to do. Its being representative of the people does not 
mend the matter—for it is only representative within its 
strict line of powers and duties—representative to do certain 
things laid down for it. In the same way, the Executive is 
representative. The Legislature is moreover the creature of 
the sovereignty, established through the constitution. So 
the Executive, Judiciary, Clerks, Attorneys, Justices of the 
Peace—all creatures of the Constitution; all representative 
of sovereignty to the end of doing certain things that are 
written for each respectively to do; and one not more free, 
not more representative, therefore, essentially, than the 
others. In which view, what right has the Legislature, a 


10 


creature of the constitution, to take measures for the irregu¬ 
lar amendment or overthrow of the constitution, any more 
than the Executive has—the Judiciary—a State's Attorney— 
any more than a justice of the peace has—all being creatures 
of the constitution, and one not more essentially represent¬ 
ative of sovereignty than the others? And why, for that 
matter, would not the edict of the Governor, calling a con¬ 
vention, be just as valid as an Act of Assembly to the same 
purport, in the absence of due authority? And, why may 
not a Justice of the Peace, “by this my proclamation," 
invite a convention to reform the Constitution of the State? 
For he too is representative of Sovereignty within his proper 
sphere—because sovereignty set him up to adjudge law-suits 
in matters not involving over $100, just as it set up the Legis¬ 
lature to pass acts of Assembly within certain restrictions. It 
set neither of them up, however, as we humbly apprehend, to 
overturn the Constitution that is the Law of the existence of 
them both, whereof each is the creature and, in a certain 
small way, the agent and representative. 

And, we may add, wherein has the Legislature any more 
right to disregard that clause of the Constitution which 
refers to amendments, than those which establish itself, or 
the Judiciary? If an Act of Assembly can dispense with 
the limitations of the aforegoing clauses of the Bill of 
Bights and Article XI of the Constitution, why may not an 
Act of Assembly dispense with the particular provisions of 
any other article of the Constitution as well ? 

But, to return to a direct examination of the Legislative 
restrictions, let us inquire whether the Legislature is in¬ 
hibited from the passage of such a bill as that under 
discussion. The power of the General Assembly extends to 
all rightful subjects of Legislation, except in the respects in 
which it is limited by the Constitution of which it is the 
creature. These limitations are very numerous, and relate 
to many subjects; but in respect of this particular inquiry, 
they are embodied in those sections of the Bill of Bights 
before mentioned, taken in connection with Article XI of 
the Constitution itself, which is entitled, “Of Amendment to 
the Constitution and is in the following words: 

“amendment op the constitution. 

“ It shall be the duty of the Legislature, at its first session immediately 
succeeding the returns of every census of the United States, hereafter 
taken, to pass a law for ascertaining, at the next general election of 
Delegates, the sense of the people of Maryland in regard to calling a 
Convention for altering the Constitution ; and in case the majority of 


11 


votes cast at said election shall be in favor of calling a convention, the 
Legislature shall provide for assembling such Convention, and electing 
Delegates thereto at the earliest convenient day; and the Delegates 
to the said Convention shall be elected by the several counties of the 
State and city of Baltimore, in proportion to their representation 
respectively in the Senate and House of Delegates, at the time when 
said Convention may be called.” 

We perceive, therefore, in the Bill of Rights, a retention 
of power to alter the constitution in the manner prescribed 
by it, and a solemn declaration of the will of the sovereignty 
that it shall be changed in no other way. We then look in 
the body of the constitution for the “ Mode,” thus referred to, 
and find it embodied in the aforesaid Article XI, which by its 
very title “ Of Amendment,” indicates that it, taken as an en¬ 
tirety, is that embodiment of the will of the people mentioned 
in the bill of rights as the “mode” of amendment. In this 
article power is given to the Legislature, at certain specified 
times, to initiate a reform movement in a particular manner. 
It has no other authority to do such a thing in any other 
part of the constitution. The very language of the Bill of 
Rights holds it strictly to the one “ mode,” the one method, 
the one plan of action, the one article “of amendment” thus 
laid down in the constitution. What plainer case can possi¬ 
bly be presented to show the utter illegality of the action of 
the late Legislature, than a simple statement of these clauses? 
Upon what grounds can it be justified in disregarding the 
restraints thus imposed, and in passing a reform convention 
bill in violation of the “mode” expressed in Article XI? 

But what is thus, at the first blush, by honest interpreta¬ 
tion, a clear infringement of the law, is attempted to be ex¬ 
cused by saying, that the only object of these limitations was 
to necessitate the passage of this bill at least once in ten 
years; but that the Legislature is not estopped from submit¬ 
ting the question of reform at any other time: which would 
be an ingenious plan of relief if it did not happen to come in 
conflict with one of the plainest and most essential rules of 
interpretation. No axiom is better settled than this: Ex- 
pressio unius est exclusio alterius —the expression of one 
thing in the exclusion of every other. And probably no 
principle is more necessary in the construction of every in¬ 
strument. Indeed, it is universally applicable, and but for 
its truth, language itself would hardly be adequate to any 
certainty of expression. Its authority in the law is unques¬ 
tioned, and it regulates interpretation in almost every in¬ 
stance. Its precise effect is that the nomination, in any in¬ 
strument, of any person, method or time, by whom, in which, 


12 


or when any given thing is to be done, nece.ssarily proprio 
vigore operates the exclusion of every other couceivable per¬ 
son, method and time. For how otherwise can certainty of 
intention be reached? The times, amounts of money, powers 
and persons, named in the ordinary writings between man 
and man in the everyday business concerns of life, would be 
named to little purpose, if they did not operate exclusively. 
In fact, the truth of this position is much too patent to bear 
argumentation ; and it is hardly necessary to observe with 
what strictness this maxim is always applied to constitutional 
law, in determining grants of 'political power. For although, 
outside of any limitation, a Legislature has plenary parlia¬ 
mentary power over all rightful subjects of legislation, it is 
equally true that where a particular line of action is marked 
out, or a certain thing directed to be done in a certain way, 
or a certain power directly and expressly conferred, such ex¬ 
pression is and ought always to be strictly construed. So 
that if the constitution has laid down a mode for its own al¬ 
teration, and that mode points out the passage of a bill by 
the Legislature once in ten years providing for a convention, 
then, according to well established principles of legal inter¬ 
pretation, it follows that the Legislature is estopped from pass¬ 
ing such a bill at any other time. 

But again : It is said that the mode to which the Bill of 
Bights refers is only the machinery of a convention , not the 
time of its being called. “You must reform by means of a 
convention , but need not be bound by the time prescribed.” 
Now we have shown that the whole design of Article XI is 
to lay down this “mode” spoken of in the Bill of Bights. 
Its very title “Of Amendment” indicates that it was de¬ 
signed to cover the whole subject of reform of the Constitution 
and to prescribe the method in which it might be altered. 
It directs many separate duties: 1, the passage of an act; 
2, the ordering of a convention; 3, once in ten years; 4, the 
submission of the question at the time of the general elec¬ 
tion ; 5, a majority of votes required; 6, the legislature to 
provide for the assemblage of the convention, if called ; 7, 
and for electing delegates to it; 8, the election of the dele¬ 
gates; 9, in what proportion the counties shall be repre¬ 
sented ; 10, the submission of the Constitution for ratifica¬ 
tion, &c., &c. Now of all these several directions contained 
in Article XI, what right have we to single out any one as 
constituting the mode? By what rule of construction can 
we affirm that No. 2 is the gist of the article, and that No. 
3 is merely incidental—that one is binding on the Legisla¬ 
ture and the other not? Why, if the mere holding a con- 


33 


vention be the whole object of all these restrictions, why 
should the Legislature pass the bill at all ? Why may not 
the Governor or the Judges initiate the reform movement, 
by calling a convention ? And if all that is required be to 
preserve the agency of a convention , why would not their act 
be legal ? It is obvious that all the points aforesaid go to 
make up the mode referred to in toe Bill of Rights, and em¬ 
bodied in Article XI. We have no more authority to say 
that the mode spoken of in the Bill of Rights refers exclu¬ 
sively to any one of these points than to any other; nor that 
the Legislature had any more right to disregard the limita¬ 
tion as to time than any of the other nine limitations. But 
can it be believed that all these restrictions of the Bill of 
Rights and the Constitution were meant by the convention 
only to guarantee conventional reform, without reference to 
the time of reform ? So far from it, is clear from the pro¬ 
ceedings and debates of that body, in which these clauses 
can be traced down till they readied their present form, that 
the one great object was to establish a limitation as to the 
times of changes, in order to guard against having them too 
frequent. If it had been only intended to secure reform by 
a convention , how easy to have so stated it, without any ref¬ 
erence to time! If there be any truth in these positions, 
they result in the following propositions : 

1. That all sovereignty resides in the people, who alone 
may establish government. 

2. That, in forming a government, they may impose lim¬ 
itations on their own power, which shall remain as long at 
least as they choose to allow. 

3. That such limitations can only be disregarded by the 
power which established them; but for ever bind the mere 
agents of that power. 

4. That the clauses in the present Constitution prohibit 
the Legislature from passing a reform bill except at the times 
and in the mode therein mentioned. 

From which it follows that the passage of the act in ques¬ 
tion by the late Legislature was an assumption of power 
which did not belong to it, and that the act itself is there¬ 
fore unconstitutional and void. The nature of that assump¬ 
tion is partially illustrated by the fact that the act under¬ 
takes to command the agency of sheriffs, judges of election, 
&c., and to punish illegal voting —all of which is of course 
inoperative if there was no competency to authorize such an 
election. 

But the friends of this reform business seek further to 
justify it as being just as legal and proper as the reform move- 


14 


ment which culminated in the convention of 1851, which 
established the present Constitution. The)" assume that that 
movement was contrary to the then existing forms of law, 
and claim that that circumstance shall excuse the present 
irregularity—upon the principle, perhaps, that one wrong 
may justify another. 

If there were any truth in this assumption—if it could not 
he directly met and proved to he fallacious, as it can he, it 
were a sufficient answer to observe that a revolutionary re¬ 
form (granting it to have been such) in 1851 would hardly 
excuse a revolutionary reform in 1858; that an overturning 
of all the forms of law in one year would scarcely make such 
a proceeding legal in another. Suppose it he admitted, as 
these modern reformers contend, that the act of Assembly 
under which the convention met in 1851 was unconstitutional 
and void, because it infringed the limitations which the old 
Constitution contained ; can it therefore be reasonably con¬ 
tended that it is right, legal and politic in 1858 utterly to 
disregard and trample upon the still stronger limitations of 
the new Constitution ? If constitutional restrictions ought 
to have bound the Legislature in 1851, should they now be 
powerless to that end ? Or if the sovereignty was capable 
of imposing restraints by the old instrument, was it not com¬ 
petent to establish them in forming the new one? Besides, 
it is not altogether absurd to remark that the circumstances 
attending an irregular reform in one year may constitute its 
entire justification; and that the absence of the same great 
necessities may render highly inexpedient and unnecessary 
the resort to such a remedy at other periods. In 1850, and 
for some years preceding, it was the judgment of a large 
majority of the people of the State, of all parties, that the 
constitution needed reformation. The subject was fully agi¬ 
tated and discussed, and delegates to the Legislature were 
elected ivith almost exclusive view to the question of reform; so 
that the matter took nearly the form of a popular movement, 
and an assertion by the people as such , of their sovereign right 
to disregard limitations. The Legislature was forced into 
passing the Reform Bill by the irresistible pressure of public 
opinion, which could not be gainsayed. But can such an act 
as that, justified and hurried on by actual necessities and the 
expressed will of the people, form a precedent for the late 
unauthorized act of the Legislature, not elected with any ref¬ 
erence to reform at all, and not applied to for such action by 
any portion of the people? So we may say, that allowing 
the Legislature of ’50 and that of '58 to have labored under 
the same constitutional restrictions, the popular movements 


15 


of the former year may have authorized, or at least justified, 
the doing then of what is utterly defenceless when done in 
the latter year without such authority or justification. Nor 
does it appear that the effort now making to compromise 
the position of the Democratic party, upon the score of 
inconsistency, is tenable, for the reason that it may readily 
answer that it accomplished its purposes in 1851, and there¬ 
fore wants no more irregular reform and that by insisting 
on a reform in that year, when it was really necessary in 
many particulars, it did not, therefore, commit itself to 
support constitutional changes every year, or io join in the 
mad cry of reform which demagogues might raise at any 
moment for the accomplishment of their own purposes. 
If there he any inconsistency at all now observable in our 
Maryland politics, it is rather to be found in the course of 
the leading supporters of this present reform movement, 
who resisted and denounced that of 1850 with great ve¬ 
hemence and bitterness, because, as they said, it conflicted 
with the then constitutional restraints on the people; and 
yet are now found excusing, maintaining and justifying the 
still wilder and more dangerous doctrine that the Legislature 
has the power to disregard the limitations imposed upon it 
by the organic law! These gentlemen, if their course is 
rightly apprehended, have all their lives been boasting of 
their “ conservatism;” and of their opposition to the wild 
“ Spirit of Democracy,” which they affirmed to be the cause 
of these irregular constitutional changes; how strange, then, 
to find them converts, even to their own exaggerated repre¬ 
sentations of that “Spirit of Democracy”—deserting every 
position they took in the past—becoming the champions of 
what they have always professed to abhor—seeking to do 
now what they bitterly denounced when less extravagantly 
done by others—and, what is most remarkable, justifying 
their own present action by a Democratic precedent, and 
now practically approving that precedent which they vio¬ 
lently condemned at the time it was established! 

u '01i! flesh, flesh, how art thou fishified !” 

Are men thus false, upon occasion, to their most solemn con¬ 
victions—thus ready to sacrifice principle to a low partisan 
expediency—fit to be intrusted with the direction of public 
affairs? Or can the sober-minded people of the State have 
confidence in any movement instituted by them for so import¬ 
ant a purpose as constitutional reform? 

But, at the time of the reform movement of '50, there were 
many persons in the state, of acknowledged experience and 


16 


ability, who did not regard it as an assumption of power by 
the legislature at that time; and it is far from being clear 
that the limitations upon amendments, contained in the old 
and the new constitutions, are so far identical as to render 
the Act of ’50 and that of ’58 equally legal and constitu¬ 
tional. And, although we regard the foregoing considera¬ 
tions as ample to meet the argument drawn from the prece¬ 
dent of ’50, it may not be altogether irrelevant to notice this 
point for a moment. And it may be observed at the start, 
that the legality of the former movement was always and 
altogether based by its friends upon the assertion that the 
Legislature had the power to pass the reform bill; they were 
not driven, like their successors of our day, to find their jus¬ 
tification in vague generalities, concerning the sovereign 
power of the people, that do not really touch the point of the 
legality of their proceeding in the premises. 

Now, in a comparison of the two instruments a very pal¬ 
pable difference strikes us in the provisions of the respective 
Bills of Bights—for whereas the former retained impliedly 
for the people the power to amend, alter or abolish at any 
time , the latter, as we have seen, expressly qualifies this re¬ 
tention by adding the words, “ in the manner prescribed in 
this Constitution .” Here is then at least one important and 
very expressive point, in which the limitations of the present 
instrument are purposely made more stringent than those of 
the former; and if this increased strictness be not capable of 
binding the sovereign people, it at least ought forcibly to op¬ 
erate upon the functions of their mere agents. Besides, under 
the old Constitution, the Legislature had a grant of full legis¬ 
lative power —equaling almost in its extent what Blackstone 
terms the “ supreme power of the Parliament.” It even had 
the power of altering the Constitution of the State by its own 
act , just as it is affirmed of Parliament that it may change 
the Constitution of the realm. The only limitation imposed 
upon it, in this regard, was that if it should undertake to 
amend it by its own motion , it should only do so by two suc¬ 
cessive acts of Assembly. For, that clause in the Consti¬ 
tution that seemed to prohibit reform in any other mode, 
had an obvious reference to this great power intrusted to the 
legislature, and was designed to be construed in connection 
therewith, in order to effect the great object of the framers of 
that constitution in that behalf, which plainly was that the 
Legislature should not reform the constitution by its mere mo¬ 
tion, unless by passing two successive acts. It is plain that 
the prohibitory clause referred to was not intended to stop 
any other mode of reformation, which the people might de- 


17 


mand—for such a construction would conflict with the gen¬ 
eral doctrine of the ultimate power of the people as sovereign, 
with the fact that that constitution itself was the work of a 
convention, and with the further fact that by plain implica¬ 
tion the right of the people in the premises was absolutely 
retained without any qualification whatever. But, as the 
legislature, under that constitution, was expressly endowed 
with power over all rightful subjects of legislation, why was 
it not proper for it to decline the exercise of its reformatory 
powers, and pass a hill submitting the question to the people ? 
There was no prohibition on the passage of such a hill—on 
the contrary, it fell within the due scope of ordinary legisla¬ 
tive power, since it is plain that the restrictive clauses applied 
only to the contingency of exclusive legislative reform. In 
other words, although the legislature could not then, by its 
own motion, have changed the constitution otherwise than by 
two successive acts, it was not clear at the time that it had not 
the power to pass the reform bill, as an ordinary exercise of 
its parliamentary functions granted by the constitution. 

But in the convention which framed the present constitu¬ 
tion the recurrence of this turn of affairs was sought to he 
effectually prevented by the leading anti-reformers in that 
body. They were not content with imposing the ordinary 
restrictions upon amendments, but they saw to it that there¬ 
after the Legislature should not only not have the power to 
change the constitution at all, but that it should not even have 
the power of passing a reform bill except at stated periods. The 
facility with which the then pending reform movement had 
been legally brought about, determined them so to arrange it 
that the Legislative power should be expressly limited in the 
very point in which it had not been qualified before. Hence 
the increased stringency of the Bill of Rights and the adop¬ 
tion of Article XI of the Constitution, appointing a definite 
mode of amendment, viz: allowing the Legislature to pass 
a reform bill once in ten years; by the nomination of which 
mode and time, as has been shown, the Legislature is, by 
every just rule of legal construction, shorn of its power to 
submit the question of reform at any other time. In this 
then consists, as we think, a wide difference between the 
powers of these respective Legislatures: the former, in its 
ordinary exercise of right, might legally pass the reform hill 
which it did pass; whereas the right to pass such a hill, ex¬ 
cept at stated periods, is the very thing that is denied to the 
latter by the new constitution. If this be so, there is then an 
absence of analogy between the act of 1858 and that of 1850, 
arising from the dissimilarity of the powers of the Legisla- 
2 


18 


tures, by which they were respectively passed, touching the 
very point of the right to pass them* 

II. To turn now from a discussion of the legality of the 
present movement for reform to a consideration of its expe¬ 
diency, we “ draw as it were within a much narrower circle;” 
for the reason that, as far as appears, the people are yet to be 
informed of the causes which have occasioned the movement. 
They had a right to expect that so serious a step would not 
he contemplated at any time, except upon weighty considera¬ 
tions of public policy; hut certainly those reasons must he of 
the very gravest character, that could have justified the au¬ 
thors of this movement in asking the Legislature to overstep 
its constitutional powers, and irregularly to anticipate that 
period of quiet reform which the people, whose agents they 
were, had solemnly appointed in the organic law. Yet we, 
are not aware of the first effort having been yet made to fur¬ 
nish any adequate representation of the present defects, in¬ 
conveniences or grievances, that have been deemed sufficient 
to warrant this invasion of the retained rights of the people. 
So that, in point of fact, we are hurried to the polls, upon 
barely two months’ notice—a time especially insufficient for 
the formation of public sentiment in the rural districts—and 
required to vote yea or nay upon the most momentous ques¬ 
tion that can be presented to a republican people, quietly en¬ 
joying the blessings of a government they have themselves 
but just established; and then we are left, forsooth, to guess 
the reasons that existed for throwing us into a turmoil such 
as this, that may renew old conflicts and embitter the feelings 
of the people ! 

°In the old Bill of Rights, there was no expression given to the inherent 
power of the people to change their government, beyond those clauses which 
declared that “ all government originates from the people,” (Art. 1,) and 
which set forth their “ exclusive right to regulate the internal government and 
police ” of the State (Art. 2.) The existence of such a power, however, was 
of course understood, taken for granted, and unnecessary to be formally ex¬ 
pressed; for, indeed, it was incidental to, and implied in, the very act of 
forming the Bill of Rights itself; that having been an exercise of popular 
power. The 42d article of the same declared that the Constitution “ ought 
not to be changed by the Legislature, &c.,” except in the mode which it might 
prescribe. And the 59th clause of the Constitution proper proceeded to ap¬ 
point two successive acts of Assembly as the mode in which the Legislature , 
of its own motion, might reform and amend, &c.; which last clause, bearing 
an obvious reference to that which preceded, must be construed along with it. 
So that all the limitations of the old instrument were intended as reslrictions 
to operate only upon absolute Legislative reform, and did not extinguish the 
right of the Assembly to enact a bill, submitting the question to the people, as 
a due exercise of its ordinary Legislative authority. But the limitations of the 
present instrument, it is submitted, actually dock the Legislative power of the 
Assembly in this regard, by making illegal the passage of any such law except 
at specified periods. 


19 


The Eeform agitation, which resulted in the adoption 
of the Constitution under which we now live, extended 
through several years, was incessantly discussed before the 
people and through every channel by which public attention 
could be reached. That open, palpable, and undeniable 
reasons for reform existed, very few ever seriously doubted; 
and, indeed, the gist of the party conflicts it at first engen¬ 
dered, turned rather on the mode by which Reform was 
sought to he accomplished than on the propriety of Reform 
itself. By successive alterations, the old Constitution had 
already, to a great degree, lost its original character, and 
very many of those of its primitive features that remained 
had become antiquated, illiberal, inadequate to existing 
wants, and unsuited to the progression, experience and 
genius of the times. Towards - the end of the contest, 
indeed, party lines became almost lost sight of—the leaders 
of each division of opinion vieing with those of the others, 
for the merit of being the “best Reformers;” and this is 
admirably illustrated by the fact that in the Convention 
which formed the present instrument, there was a majority 
of members belonging to that political organization which 
is represented as having opposed Reform in a body! The 
work accomplished by the Convention was a modification 
of the general character of the organic- law. It was 
modernized, liberalized, popularized, in accordance with the 
then received views of public policy. Those questions that 
had always distracted sentiment within the State, were defi¬ 
nitely and honorably settled upon a basis that has been 
approved of by the people. The great elective principle 
of the government, the right of the people to choose their 
own officers, was put into operation, and the apportionment 
of representation was arranged in a manner which, if it did 
not suit all parties at the time, appears to have met the 
public acquiescence since. Under the Constitution, so fixed, 
we have now lived the brief space of seven years. Those 
portions of it, whose meaning was doubtful, have undergone 
judicial construction, and the interpretation of the whole in¬ 
strument is now as well settled, perhaps, as any human 
instrument can be. During all this time we have heard no 
discontent. Certainly, however, to speak within bounds, no 
discontent has been manifested to the extent of warranting a 
belief, that the people wished to anticipate the time them¬ 
selves had fixed for the orderly amendment of such evils as 
the new form of government might develop. There has 
been no new question of Reform raised in any portion of the 
State. We have had several general, and many local 


20 


elections. The Legislature has been in session several 
times. Yet never, until the past winter, did any one dream 
that such a movement as this was contemplated by a single 
citizen! And what was there before that body to lead it to 
infer that the popular will lay in this direction? Were its 
members elected upon any such issue ? Did any of them 
moot the question during the canvass? Did any political 
party unfurl the banner of Reform ? Were any of them in¬ 
structed by their constituents to do this thing ? Never, 
never! Not a solitary word had been spoken on the subject 
during the canvass. Not a hint had been given of any such 
intention. Not a single petition was presented to the 
Assembly, asking such action. Like his namesake of the 
past, “ Old Caesar” had led his hosts along, all unsuspicious 
of the object, until suddenly they were brought face to face 
with this Rubicon of Reform, and were bid to pass it in the 
name of the party! The thing has not been demanded by 
the people to any extent; we have no right to suppose they 
wished it, but the presumption is against such a hypothesis— 
and, to that extent, the impolicy of the movement is suffi¬ 
ciently exhibited, because it is a matter that has exclusive 
reference to the popular will, in all its bearings. But the 
circumstances under which it has been thrust on an un¬ 
willing people, show it to be scarcely above the level of a 
political trick, and indicate to what a fearful extent small 
demagogues, having nothing to lose, will meddle with and 
unsettle those subjects that are of the last importance to the 
welfare of the body politic. 

Perhaps there is no State in the Union in which State 
pride is stronger, while the interests of its several sections 
are so diverse as in Maryland. The natural division of the 
State by its great artery of commerce, and the palpably 
separate interests of the several parts of the larger division, 
have always produced and kept alive an internal rivalry 
the marks whereof are even yet visible in the organic law, 
in these peculiar and anomalous provisions by which her 
whole area is “districted” for the choice of certain great 
officers. These circumstances have also always fostered an 
incessant jealousy between the sections upon many subjects, 
but particularly upon that of the basis of representation— 
which has been an undying source of contention in the past, 
and has produced the warmest excitement among the people 
whenever its alteration has been proposed. All these ques¬ 
tions have been settled by the people in the present Consti¬ 
tution for ever—at least so as not to be agitated in an 
uncertain and dangerous manner for the future, but only in 


21 


that quiet and orderly method which themselves have therein 
appointed, for gradually considering the alteration of them 
as the necessity may arise. It is unfortunate enough, indeed, 
that these great interests should ever he brought under 
discussion and a conflict for power and influence engendered 
between the sections of the Htate; but is it wise, is it 
prudent, is it politic, that an occasion should he given for 
their agitation, when such agitation is not necessary nor 
sought by the people; or is it statesmanlike or patriotic, 
to disregard the provisions of the organic law with a cer¬ 
tainty of inciting these conflicts, when the only objects 
proposed are merely secondary in their nature? Surely, 
if the people of Maryland must, perforce, be periodically 
thrown into such discordance, in God’s name, let us not 
anticipate the time for the consideration of such topics! In 
this regard it is profoundly true, that the evil is sufficient 
unto its day. 

In reference to these matters, the danger and impolicy 
of frequent changes is sufficiently apparent. Unquestion¬ 
ably, exciting questions, that have been settled upon com¬ 
promise, ought not to be rashly reopened. But does not the 
same reasoning apply generally to the leading features 
of the Constitution ? Whatever may he, abstractly or theo¬ 
retically, their soundness in the light of political philosophy, 
is it advisable that they should he perpetually in a state 
of alteration—that the fundamental principles of the gov¬ 
ernment should be always on the anvil of political tinkers ? 
If we may trust the judgment of some of the wisest 
publicists, even the form of a government is of little conse¬ 
quence as compared with its fixedness: and how palpable is 
this true of the mere details of that form! It does, indeed, 
seem to be a small matter what may be the peculiar features 
of the written instrument that governs us, so. it. comport 
with the genius of our institutions, be settled in its terms 
and interpretation, and bear equally upon all; and this 
unceasing mania for overthrowing the foundations of our 
institutions, is a sad but striking application of the wdsdom 
of him who washed his hands of such discussions and said: 

11 On forms of Government, let fools contest! 

That which is best administered is best.” 

But, in point of fact, the few objections we have heard 
urged to the present constitution, as reasons for the violent 
attempt to change it, do not appear to he aimed chiefly at 
its leading characteristics. The elective principle it embodies 
is, no doubt, offensive to many, whose whole lives have been 


22 


spent in endeavoring to curtail the rights of the people, and 
who, if they had the power, would unquestionably restrict 
them to the narrowest functions. But still, some little 
remaining fear of the people restrains them from an open 
attack upon this principle, as such , and confines them to 
complaining of some of its applications. Thus, one man 
objects to the election of the Judges; another to the election 
of Justices of the Peace; and so on, through a long scale of 
all conceivable objections, such as are usually developed in 
every controversy among men. This is no place to enter into 
any discussion of the policy of electing Judges by the people. 
It is one which can only be settled by the test of experience, 
and on which thinking men may honestly differ. But, 
putting aside its peculiar merits, what objections are urged 
by our modern reformers against electing Judges, that are 
not equally potent as against electing the Governor, the 
Legislature, the Sheriffs, or any other officers who, every one 
agrees, ought to be elected by the people? It will not do 
to say that Judges ought to be chosen from considerations 
above party, because, to go to the bottom of the matter, 
so ought Executives and Legislatures to be appointed. It 
will not do to say that Judges must be exempt on the bench 
from all outside pressure; for, however true this is, it is 
realized even now by the present system; and, besides, 
it does not appear that Executives or Legislatures ought 
to be so influenced in performing their duties. Each is 
as responsible and as important in his sphere as 1 the others, 
and ought as well to be chosen from considerations of fitness. 
And if the people be, as they are acknowledged to be, 
capable of electing one, why are they incapable of electing 
the others ? Or, why is it that Executive selection of 
Judges is pronounced necessarily so much more- unerring 
than the popular voice, when that voice, in fact, elects the 
Executive? In truth, these objections do not go so much 
to show the impolicy of electing Judges, as to invalidate and 
discredit the principle of popular elections generally. 

Doubtless a change, at least in the details of the present ju¬ 
dicial arrangement, by which judges should be chosen for a 
smaller area, might contribute more fully to the development 
of the elective theory. But the real question for the people 
now is this: are the evils, real or imaginary, arising from 
the present system, of such fearful magnitude as to necessi¬ 
tate immediate revolutionary reform? Are these great incon¬ 
veniences, so suddenly discovered the past winter, of such 
overpowering importance, as to justify an irregular overthrow 
of the constitution, or a gross assumption of power by the 


23 


Legislature, for tlie purpose of anticipating the regular rou¬ 
tine of periodical reform ? Could we not possibly have waited 
till 1861 ? That is the question for the people now —that is 
the test by which all objections to the present constitution, 
whether they touch matters of principle or matters of mere 
detail, ought to be tried. No man says the instrument is a 
perfect one. No man denies that in very many respects it 
might be improved. But very many do contend that its im¬ 
perfections, striking as they may he, did not warrant that 
great outrage on the rights of the people, which was sought 
to be accomplished by this new reform hill. 

To these considerations it might be added, in further proof 
of the impolicy of the movement, that it is not possible any 
constitution should be formed that shall suit every body , and 
square with the political doctrines of every citizen. But it 
would seem, indeed, that this miracle must be accomplished 
before we shall be able to live in peace in Maryland, if every 
little nest of demagogues who may be dissatisfied with the 
organic law, or who may wish to change it for its own sinis¬ 
ter ends, shall be able, independently of any popular move¬ 
ment, to bring down the Constitution about our ears! Be¬ 
sides—what guarantee have we that we shall be the gainers 
by the operation, or that the instrument to be formed will be 
superior to that we now have? Is the character, standing, 
reputation or influence of the ringleaders of this movement 
such as to promise us that we shall better our condition by 
the change, or to warrant us in disregarding the admonition 
that possibly we may fly to other and worse evils that we 
know not of? The men who framed the present Constitu¬ 
tion were the first citizens of the State in every respect. So 
able a body perhaps never met before in Maryland. Shall 
we suppose they meant nothing in what they have written; 
that they cast no thought on what they were doing? Shall 
we take it for granted that they gave us a stone, when we 
asked for bread ? Oh ! it would make a Mercutio break his 
sides with laughter to become aware by whom, and for what 
purposes, we are bid to write down as blockheads the Re¬ 
formers of 1851; to see the difference of calibre between those 
who built and those who would pull down the Constitution, 
and to note the high experience of the former in comparison 
with the wisdom of these their latter day revisers, of whose 
performances in public affairs Iago would not greatly have 
erred in affirming that 

-“Mere prattle , without practice, 

Is all their soldiership !”- 




24 


But again. In thus considering the policy of this move¬ 
ment, let us observe another of its features. We all know 
that the Reform Question would have been submitted to the 
people in 1861, anyhow, by the due operation of Article XI 
of the Constitution itself; and that the professed object is to 
anticipate the terribly long period intervening ’twixt now 
and then, that we may the sooner be rid of these formidable 
inconveniences. Well, the call of the convention is to be 
voted upon on the 26th of May. In October next the dele¬ 
gates are to be elected. In January, 1859, the convention is 
to meet and to sit as long as it shall choose. In the fall of 
that year, the Constitution it shall form is to be submitted; 
then the returns of the election are to be made, and in due 
season thereafter the result announced. So that the year 
1860 will have actually come upon us before this constitutional 
reform can take effect! And thus our impatient agitators, 
after all the excitement, trouble and expense to be now occa¬ 
sioned, will actually, provided they shall have the best of 
luck, only succeed in anticipating by one year , the regular 
legal and constitutional period for the inauguration of a 
movement for Reform ! Of a truth, this is indeed a vast ob¬ 
ject for which to sacrifice the peace of the community ! And 
then, again, some of us country people are disposed to exam¬ 
ine how much it will cost the people to indulge our reformers 
in this useless whim. Already one hundred thousand dollars 
have been appropriated as a sort of outfit for the Convention. 
The incidentals and the infit we shall have to foot up after¬ 
wards, besides the cost of three general elections , and of the 
various elections, and other arrangements which may be 
necessary to put the new constitution in motion. Probably 
half a million dollars, to be wrung from a people already 
taxed almost beyond endurance, for a mere caprice, extorted 
by those who have not relieved the people in that regard one 
penny! not to speak of the demoralization to be occasioned 
by all these elections, and all this excitement, consequent 
upon the action of those who profess to dislike the frequency 
of elections! Lastly, we suppose something is due to the 
sanctity of the organic law. Some portions of the people— 
certainly those of my section—have an old-fasTftoned way of 
regarding their Constitution as having some claim to their 
respect; they dislike to see rude hands laid upon it, and to 
see it made a shuttlecock for the amusement of demagogues ; 
they would prefer that when changed it should be amended 
“ decently, and in order,” and that its overthrows should not 
be so frequent as to reduce it more to the likeness of a mere 
act of Assembly, than that of a stable and venerated Consti- 


25 


tution. And it may be that the patriotism and truth of such 
sentiments are not altogether effaced, nor their utility en¬ 
tirely dispensed with, by the fact that the course and spirit 
of our recent Maryland politics have been such as to deny 
and trample on the sanctity of all law, whether human or 
divine. 

If, then, this reform movement will renew local animosities 
that ought to slumber ; if it will disturb compromises already 
settled, and provoke rivalries against which stability is the 
only precaution; if it be not demanded by any very urgent 
public necessity, nor made imperative by real evils; if the 
present Constitution is as generally satisfactory as any other 
is likely to be, and as perfect as any we shall probably get in 
its place; if the contemplated change will contribute to help 
on the wild spirit of reform, to unsettle that which ought to 
be stable, and to make a by-word of that which ought to be 
held sacred; and* if only the briefest period is to be gained 
in the attainment of regular and legal reform, after all the 
excitement and conflicts, demoralization and costs thus to be 
realized and endured,—if these things be so, we ask can it be 
doubted that it is the part of wisdom, prudence, good-citizen¬ 
ship, and sound statesman-like foresight to let this project 
pass by as the idle wind, and to decline to authorize the call 
of a Convention ? 

III. The considerations that have been advanced may be 
sufficient to give an outline of the very many reasons why 
the policy of this movement may be seriously questioned; 
and to exhibit, in a general way, the character of the objec¬ 
tions that may be justly raised to its endorsement by the 
people, considering it merely as a proposition for an irregular 
or revolutionary reform, just as any other movement of the 
same character might be objected to, if inaugurated before the 
time specified in the Constitution. But there is another class 
of objections to it, arising from other than general considera¬ 
tions of expediency, that appeals more directly to the senti¬ 
ments of a large portion of the people of the State, because 
touching more nearly their interests; and which, therefore, 
is likely to be, and indeed ought to be, more potent to influ¬ 
ence their action in the premises than any generalization 
whatever. “Salus populi suprema lex” is both morally and 
politically true of every community, and as there cannot be 
any consideration more powerful than self-interest to arouse 
its energies, so no incentivecan be more worthy in stimulat¬ 
ing the efforts of those, who strive to protect themselves and 
their fellows in the enjoyment of their just political rights 
and influence. And not a little reason has been given for 


26 


tlie development of this class of objections, by the passage of 
the recent Reform bill, because it has become apparent that, 
in its effects, it is likely to reopen the great questions setteld 
in the present Constitution, and to rekindle the jealousies and 
anxieties of the different sections of the State, before spoken 
of. And, if indeed this is about to be done; if a state of 
affairs is likely to be brought soon about, when the rela¬ 
tions of those sections shall again be opened for a new con¬ 
test and a new settlement; then, indeed, is it both natural 
and reasonable that each section should feel alarmed for its 
own privileges, and should begin to examine this whole 
movement, in the light of its own interests, and of its rela¬ 
tions to the present guarantees that are essential to its wel¬ 
fare. 

The indications that have already appeared to justify this 
sectional watchfulness are varied in their character. Some, 
of them have been hereinbefore adverted to, in referring to 
the suddenness with which this movement has been thrust 
upon our attention, which is alone calculated to produce dis¬ 
trust in its honest purposes; which, however, in another con¬ 
nection, shall be more fully noticed afterwards. But it is 
not a little singular, that circumstances which occurred at the 
time the bill itself was passed, and which stand recorded on 
the journals of the two houses of the Assembly, are of them 
selves adequate to establish motives on the part of the con- 
coctors of the movement, likely to render it highly dangerous 
to the interests of the counties, or else to enfold its authors 
in an inextricable web of confusion, inconsistency and absurd¬ 
ity of action. This will appear by some brief notice of the 
course pursued by them, and by the majority generally, upon 
the several amendments that were offered to the bill in both 
Houses, to which I ask your attention for a moment. 

When the bill came up for consideration on the first day 
of March last, in the House of Delegates, I had the honor to 
propose the following amendment, as an additional section: 

“ Sec. 2. And be it enacted, That it shall not be deemed and taken 
that the said convention is duly approved of by the people, or author¬ 
ized to be called together, or to meet for the purpose contemplated by 
this act, unless on the said fourth Wednesday in May next, a majority 
of the actual legal voters of the State shall vote ‘for’ the said conven¬ 
tion ; and the said majority shall be computed with reference to the total 
vote polled for Governor in the year 1857, as a standard.” 

Which was at once lost, by a strict party vote. It cannot be 
pretended that the Legislature had not the power to adopt 
this amendment, for if it had any authority at all to direct 


27 


an election on the call, it surely had the right to say by how 
many votes it should he ordered. It was argued , in support 
of the proposition, by several opponents of the whole bill, 
that the adoption of the amendment was the only way of 
testing whether a majority of the people really wished a 
changein the Constitution; for, in that event, they might be 
justly expected to go to the polls and vote for it, so as to in¬ 
sure its being called. It was further argued that great diffi¬ 
culty existed, and must always exist, in the rural districts, 
in bringing out a full vote; and that unless the above or 
some similar restriction were introduced, the counties would 
be placed at the mercy of the city of Baltimore and of the 
few very thickly populated districts, in which the concentra¬ 
tion of population would always insure a large vote; and, 
moreover, that if the Legislature should always assume au¬ 
thority to submit this question of Reform, and this particular 
bill should become a precedent , then a large portion of the 
people of the State would be, practically, always at the mercy 
of even a majority of that small portion of the people of the 
city and districts aforesaid, who might choose to vote. And 
it is not to be denied that the amendment was supported with 
not the less eagerness, from the consideration that recent 
events had proved the capacity of certain parties in the city 
to regulate its majorities to suit themselves. But these ap¬ 
peals were of no avail, and no such provision was allowed to 
be incorporated in the bill. It may be well to bear this fact 
in mind, in connection with the secrecy of the whole move¬ 
ment, as, taken in that and other relations, it may shed some 
light upon the inquiry, whether the concoctors of this move¬ 
ment really and honestly meant to test the sense of the people 
fairly upon this reform business, or whether reform had not 
been already determined on beforehand, and the submission 
to the people a mere farcical ceremony. 

On the 2d day of March, when the bill was again taken up 
for consideration, I had the honor to offer six other amend¬ 
ments, also in the form of additional sections, partly for the 
purpose of testing the opinions and designs of the reformers, 
and partly for the purpose of effecting, if possible, the sta¬ 
bility and protection of certain leading interests. Of these, 
the first was merely introductory, and the last explanatory of 
their purposes and rendering them operative and efficient. 
They are as follows : 


FIRST AMENDMENT. 

Section 11. And be it enacted, as the express and undoubted meaning 
of this act, that the convention provided for by this act shall be held and 


28 


deemed to have power, in the manner hereinbefore granted, to alter and 
amend all parts, provisions and features of the existing constitution and 
bill of rights except those hereinafter expressly excepted. 

Which was of course rejected, as that already named. 

SECOND AMENDMENT. 

Section 12. And he it enacted, that the said convention, if it shall 
assemble in pursuance of this act, shall have no power or authority, 
directly or indirectly in any manner whatever, to alter, amend or 
change, or to recommend any alterations, emendation or change, in any 
of those parts, articles, sections or provisions of the existing constitution 
and bill of rights which recognize, protect or establish the institution of 
negro slavery and the relation of master and slave in this State. 

Which was agreed to—yeas, 44; nays, 22. 

THIRD AMENDMENT. 

Section 13. xAnd be it enacted, that the said convention if it Shall 
assemble in pursuance of this act, shall have no power or authority, 
directly or indirectly, in any manner whatever, to alter, amend or 
change, or to recommend any alteration, emendation or change in any 
of those parts, articles, sections or provisions of the present constitution 
and bill of rights, which establish the basis of representation of the 
several counties and the city of Baltimore in the Senate and House of 
Delegates. 

Which was lost—yeas, 25; nays, 37. 

FOURTH AMENDMENT. 

Section 14. And be it enacted, that the said convention, if it shall 
assemble in pursuance of this act, shall have no power or authority, 

directly or indirectly, in any manner whatever, to alter, amend or 

change, or to recommend any alteration, emendation or change, in any 
of those parts, articles, sections or provisions of the existing Constitu¬ 
tion and Bill of Rights which give to the people the power of electing 
the principal officers of the several departments of the government under 
the same, and which recognize the extension of popular rights in that 
regard, which was inaugurated by the movements that resulted in the 
adoption of the present Constitution. 

Which was lost—ayes, 15 ; nays, 45. 

FIFTH AMENDMENT. 

Section 15. And be it enacted, That the said convention, if it shall 
assemble in pursuance of this act, shall have no power or authority, 

directly or indirectly, in any manner whatever, to alter, amend or 

change, or to recommend any alteration, emendation or change in any 
of those parts, articles, sections or provisions of the existing Constitu¬ 
tion and Bill of Rights, which establish the city of Annapolis as the seat 
of Government. 

Which was lost—ayes, 21; nays, 41. 


29 


SIXTH AMENDMENT. 

Section 16. And be it enacted, As the express and undoubted mean¬ 
ing of this act, that in reference to the taking the sense of the people 
on the 4th Wednesday of May next, as hereinbefore provided, this act 
shall be construed as follows, and in no other way, namely: That it 
is the express meaning of this act only to authorize a vote by the people 
on the first Wednesday of May next, as to the expediency of calling the 
convention aforesaid as a body that is to be necessarily limited in its 
powers to the extent of the exceptions, limitations and denial of powers 
herein recited. And the ballots to be cast on the said day “ for ” 
or “ against” the convention, as hereinbefore provided, shall be held, 
taken and deemed to signify only the wishes, opinions and will of the 
people, favorable or unfavorable, as the case may be, as to the calling 
a convention limited and restricted in the respects aforesaid, it being 
the express and deliberate intention of this act that the only question 
before the people on the said first Wednesday in May, shall be the 
expediency of calling a convention limited as aforesaid. 

Which was lost—yeas, 19; nays, 42. 

Mr. Tiiruston, a Democratic member from Alleghany 
county, then proposed the two following amendments, ad¬ 
ditional sections to the bill: 

Section —. And be it enacted, That the said Convention, if it shall 
assemble in pursuance of this act, shall have no power or authority, 
directly or indirectly, in any manner whatever, to alter, amend, change, 
abridge, abbreviate, limit, annul, or do away with the guarantees of 
religious liberty, in the present Constitution and Bill of Rights con¬ 
tained and expressed, nor shall it establish any religious test as a 
qualification for office, or a condition or qualification to the elective 
franchise in this State. 

Which was lost—ayes, 20; nays, 39. 

Section —. And be it enacted, That the said Convention, if it shall 
assemble in pursuance of this act, shall have no power, directly or in¬ 
directly, in any manner whatsoever, to alter, abridge, change, annul, 
deny, reverse or overturn the principle established by the present Con¬ 
stitution, that all citizens of the United States shall have and enjoy all 
the rights, privileges and franchises, civil and political, and of property, 
secured and guaranteed to them by the Constitution and Bill of Rights 
of this State, as they at present exist. 

Which was lost—ayes, 18; nays, 42. 

These several amendments have been cited entire from the 
journals, in order that their full scope may be presented, and 
that it may appear what were the exact propositions upon 
which the members were called to decide. It is not proposed 
to analyze the vote in each case, nor to refer to the actions of 
individual members, further than to remark, that the amend- 


30 


merits were sustained generally by the minority and voted 
down by the majority of the House; but to submit a few 
observations, tending to show the truth of what was premised 
at the opening of this particular inquiry. 

When the amendments were offered, the objection raised 
to them was that they would be inefficient, because they only 
amounted to Legislative restrictions upon a convention of the 
people; an attempt by an Act of Assembly to usurp or to 
confine the unlimited powers of the sovereignty. It may be 
well said, indeed, that this was an exceedingly consistent 
objection to come from those who were, at that very time, 
endeavoring to consummate an act which was, in the highest 
degree, derogatory to that sovereignty of whose rights they 
appeared to be so tender in the matter of these amendments; 
for it would have been difficult to discover, in those several 
propositions, any Legislative assumption that was worthy to 
be compared with the high-handed assumption implied in 
the passage of the bill itself. It was an amusing circum¬ 
stance indeed, that they who, without wincing, could boldly 
lay hands on the powers of sovereignty, and unhesitatingly 
disregard the limitations that sovereignty had imposed upon 
them, and call a convention in a manner not warranted by 
the Constiution, should have suddenly become so squeamish 
in defining the powers of the convention, lest they should 
perchance encroach upon the power of the people! It was 
amusing to observe how they, who had scorned the privileges 
and commands of sovereignty in the general, should be so 
delicate, and cautious, and modest about even presenting the 
semblance'of derogating from sovereign rights, in the detail! 

If there were no further and complete answer to that 
objection, however—if it could not be shown to be utterly 
without foundation, by the very terms of the amendments, 
as it can be—there might be room to inquire whether the 
objection had any force upon its own merits; whether, under 
the peculiar circumstances of the case , the Legislature might 
not have limited the action of the convention at pleasure. 
There is no question, of course, that in a reform movement 
begun by the People , or authorized by the sovereignty to be 
conducted contrarily to the forms of law, the Legislature 
would have no shadow of right to interfere for any purpose, 
and least of all for the purpose of limiting its powers. There 
is no question that a convention, proceeding and deriving its 
just authority from the will of the sovereignty, would be in¬ 
capable of being trammeled at the hands of a mere agent of 
the sovereignty. But was this such a convention ? Clearly, 
if there be any truth in what has already been advanced in 


31 


tliis connection, the sovereignty had never authorized the 
convening of such a body at that time, and if it shall 
assemble it will assemble in obedience to the direction, not 
of the sovereignty, but of the Legislature which called it 
into being. So that, independently of any validity it may 
seem to acquire from popular sanction hereafter, if such 
sanction be vouchsafed, still at the time this bill and these 
amendments were before the Legislature , the contemplated 
convention could be regarded in no other light than as a 
Legislative creation, as the creature of the body which passed 
the bill, whereby its assemblage is directed. In maturing 
that measure, the Legislature was actually creating this 
bantling step by step; was proceeding upon its own sole 
authority and responsibility, to call into being a body for 
certain purposes. What could have hindered the Legisla¬ 
ture, then, from fashioning the creature to its own liking ? 
Why, in thus independently proceeding to suit itself in the 
purpose contemplated , was it necessary, in any degree, to 
shape the mere details so as to square with certain rights of 
sovereignty ? Sovereignty had clearly nothing to do with 
the affair—had never authorized it, and did not want it. 
Why might not its own creator, then, have restricted it? 
And why would not those restrictions have bound it when 
it should assemble, seeing it was to meet, not in obedience to 
a direction of the people, but only and exclusively in pur¬ 
suance of the will of the Legislature ? For no one pretended 
to contend there was any constitutional warrant for this 
convention, and the whole hope of effectuating its reforms 
was based upon the subsequent acquiescence of the people. 
Thus, even upon the merits of their own position, this pre¬ 
tence of the majority might have been met not altogether 
unsuccessfully. 

For this, however, there was no necessity, inasmuch as, in 
point of fact, the amendments did not seek to limit the Con¬ 
vention by force of Legislative enactment; did not contem¬ 
plate the assertion of the doctrine that the will of the Legis¬ 
lature could restrict the sovereignty of the people. It is 
perfectly plain, as a moment’s attention will show, that this 
objection is entirely obviated by the structure of the amend¬ 
ments, and that they were 'purposely drawn to avoid its effect. 
Now it is true that the first five of them, as well as those of 
Mr. Thurston, are positive, direct, unmistakable restrictions, 
pointing out those features of the present Constitution and 
Bill of Rights, which the Convention was to have no author¬ 
ity to alter or amend. Taken alone, unexplained, these in¬ 
deed do at first look like an attempt at legislative restriction, 


32 


and as though they afforded some room to doubt their effi¬ 
ciency. But it is the sixth amendment that was designed to 
qualify and explain those which preceded, and it is precisely 
its provisions which give vitality to the others, which change 
their nature so far as to make them popular instead of legis¬ 
lative limitations, and which, if all of them had been adopted, 
would have caused the question now before the people to be 
simply the expediency of calling a limited instead of an abso¬ 
lute convention. That this is true, is apparent from the very 
words of the amendment. It sets forth clearly the meaning 
of the bill, and of its restrictive clauses, and declares it to be 
the “ express and deliberate ” intention of the Act, to take 
the sense of the people upon the expediency of altering or 
amending the provisions of the Constitution and Bill of 
Eights other than those named in the amendments; the effect, 
of which would have been that the power of limitation icould 
have been exercised over the convention , not by the legislature , 
but by the people themselves at the polls , in the very act of 
voting for a convention limited in these particulars. And 
the convention would therefore have become a limited one in 
its very inception, and would have assembled with its hands 
thus tied by the people. As to the power of the Legislature 
to have effectuated the purposes of the amendments in this 
way, there cannot be the smallest doubt; for, surely, if it 
had the right to take the sense of the people upon the expe¬ 
diency of calling a convention to amend the ivhole Constitu¬ 
tion, it certainly must have possessed what is indeed a minor 
power , viz : that of taking their sense upon a convention to 
amend certain parts of it, or to amend it generally, with 
given restrictions. And as it was contended by the majority 
that an affirmative vote by the people on the fourth Wednes¬ 
day of May, would give the convention the character of being 
a creature of the sovereignty, so we may claim that, had the 
amendments been adopted as proposed, a similar character 
would have been given to the limited convention that would 
have ensued :— it would have represented the people to the 
extent allowed by the people, viz: to the extent of altering 
all parts of the Constitution except those named in the bid. 
And indeed, in that case, the whole movement would have 
just amounted to a submission to the people of a question of 
partial reform of the Constitution, a procedure quite common 
in the States of the Union—in many of which even single 
clauses have sometimes been thus submitted. All of the 
amendments were read in the house before the vote was 
taken upon any, and thus all the members must be presumed 
to have been aware of their ability, by means of the sixth 


33 


amendment, to take out of the hands of the convention the 
great interests sought to be protected by the others. And 
hence is drawn from before them all the shelter supposed to 
be afforded by the pretence that “ the Legislature couldn’t 
control the Convention.” And the disclosure of the fact that 
they had the ability to protect the interests referred to, and 
yet declined to do it,, exposes their action to a just suspicion 
on the part of those to whom these interests are dear, and 
holds them responsible to an extent that shall be hereafter 
adverted to. 

And, as for the matter of the inability to restrict the con¬ 
vention in any particular, it may be farther noted that the 
bill itself , as reported to the House, in its original, form and 
independent of the amendments, ivas full of limitations. Thus 
it provided : (1.) that the convention should meet at a cer¬ 
tain time, exclusive of all other times ; (2.) at a certain place, 
exclusive of all other places; (3.) that the people should send 
a certain number of delegates, to the exclusion of any other 
apportionment; (4.) that the convention, in framing a con¬ 
stitution, should first pass upon it by sections ; (5.) and then 
pass upon it as a whole; (6.) that the constitution should 
subsequently be submitted by it to a popular vote—which 
was a limitation both on the people and on the convention; 
(6.) that no constitution should be submitted, unless adopted 
in the manner aforesaid. In these particulars, it is plain 
that the hands of the convention were sought to be tied up 
by the Legislature, and these several limitations now exist 
in the bill! Indeed, it would be difficult to find a sentence 
in the Act that does not, in some form or other, impose a 
limitation on the action of the people or of the convention ; 
and the fact that it would be impossible, perhaps, to frame 
such an Act without restrictions only goes to show the un¬ 
reasonableness of the pretence of a want of power to limit. 
It might be pertinent, indeed, to inquire whether the passage 
of this Act itself, directing reform only in a certain pre¬ 
scribed way, is not a restriction of the great, original power 
of the people ; but it may be at least claimed that the above 
palpable disabilities on the convention, contained in the bill 
itself, should have estopped any objections to those which it 
was proposed to insert by the amendment, as least on the 
score of a want of power to impose them. 

But to proceed: It will be observed that the second amend¬ 
ment, relating to slavery, was adopted! twenty of the majority 
voting in the affirmative and twenty of them in the nega¬ 
tive, as the recorded votes will show—among the latter being 
the particular friends of Reform and authors of the Bill. 

3 


34 


When the call of the roll was complete, almost the whole of 
the majority is believed to have stood recorded in the 
negative. Now, whether there was any thing particularly 
dangerous in the word u Slavery/' or not, need not be dwelt 
upon ; but before the announcement of the result, an ex¬ 
ample was given of a change of vote from the negative to 
the affirmative, that was quickly followed by others, until 
the vote stood as before noticed, and the amendment declared 
adopted. As has been already observed, the third amend¬ 
ment, which was designed to prevent any change in the 
present basis of representation—the great question, after all 
—was promptly rejected under the operation of the previ¬ 
ous question. The fourth amendment was intended to 
preserve the elective principle in the Constitution; to 
prevent the reversal of what was one of the great triumphs 
of the Reform movement of 1850. It did not mean that 
all officers now elective were to remain so, nor did it assert 
that the application of that principle was or was not carried 
too far in the present Constitution. It only sought to 
prevent stripping the people of their right, in accordance 
with the whole theory of the American system, to elect 
their chief officers in the several departments of the govern¬ 
ment; yet, it also was speedily rejected. So, also, was the- 
fifth amendment, designed to prevent the removal of the seat 
of government to that great vortex that appears solicitous 
of engulfing every Maryland interest. And Mr. Thhuston's 
admirable amendments, which struck in some quarters with 
peculiar severity—one of them intended to secure the present 
guarantees of religious liberty and to guard against the 
establishment of any religious test, and the other to secure 
to the citizens of the United States, for the future, those 
privileges they have enjoyed under our laws in the past— 
were also unhesitatingly voted down. So that one only 
of the amendments proposed was accepted, while all the 
others were rejected by the majority. Concerning which, 
the following observations, touching the singular course 
of the majority, seem to be founded in reason: 

1. Suppose all these amendments were void, even had they 
been adopted, and might have been disregarded by the Con¬ 
vention : why not insert them, taking the chances of their 
being not disregarded, or at least as expressions of opinion— 
provided the majority really favored the objects of the 
amendments ? 

2. Again: If they were void, still the majority adopted 
the 2d amendment. If they adopted that, believing it to 
be void, they deserve no credit, of course, from their action 


35 


for being in favor of the purpose of that amendment. 
Besides, what could they have meant in adopting that 
restriction, after declaring all the proposed restrictions to he 
void? Upon the hypothesis of their knowing it to be void, 
its acceptance was the granting an empty boon, and was a 
hollow pretence at best. 

3. But it is more charitable to the majority, to suppose that 
they acted honestly and sincerely in this matter. They 
certainly cannot be offended if we choose to believe they 
acted truthfully , even if we shall hold them to the conse¬ 
quences. Let us give them all credit, therefore, for voting 
for the 2d amendment in the belief that it would be 
effective. What, then, becomes of their argument against 
the validity of the restrictions generally ? And what, too, 
shall we say of their refusal to adopt the other amendments? 

4. If, again, as we charitably suppose, they honestly adopted 
the naked restriction contained in the 2d amendment as 
aforesaid, then why did they not adopt the sixth amendment, 
by which alone they could have effectuated the 2d, and given 
it vitality ? 

5. Again: Upon the hypothesis of their having acted 
honestly, they have refused to adopt that amendment pro¬ 
viding against the alteration of the present basis of repre¬ 
sentation, when, by their course, they have admitted they 
could have prevented such alteration. Now this issue of 
Representation is, by long odds, the most important one that 
affects the people of the Counties at all. Indeed, it may be 
said to include even the Slavery issue; for, if our representa¬ 
tion be stricken down, where is our Slavery interest, or 
where, indeed, any other interest that is of the essence 
of our prosperity ? It is therefore submitted that, by their 
action as now detailed, the authors of this Reform business 
may be brought before the people of the State as having 
deliberately evinced a determination to moot again the 
question of representation. To the same extent they may 
be said to have declared against popular elections, and 
the right of the people to choose their own servants; in 
favor of a removal of the seat of government from Annapolis 

to-they best know where; against a continuance of the 

present privileges, in this State, of citizens of the United 
States, and against a preservation of the existing guarantees 
of religious liberty and non-sectarian tests, as now happily 
in force in Maryland! Let it be marked, too, that these 
conclusions follow upon the hypothesis of their having acted 
with common honesty ! Looking to the course of the ma¬ 
jority, to ascertain the meaning of this movement, we may 


36 


conclude that if they acted dishonestly , and are willing to 
say as much in order to avoid the above dilemma, that fact 
of itself must discredit their Reform movement; whereas, 
if they have acted honestly , it is still more discredited, because 
proved to be hostile to the highest county interests. And it 
further appears, from the above analysis of their course, that 
we can only award them the praise of honesty, at the cost 
of showing them to have acted more inconsistently, more 
absurdly and more childishly, than any set of men perhaps 
that ever met in a legislative body! 

So much for the House of Delegates. At the risk of 
becoming weary, let us turn for a moment to the Senate, and 
observe what there transpired when the Reform bill was 
brought forward; and it will appear that a majority of the 
honorable occupants of that historically hallowed chamber^ 
were more obfuscated and more stultified, if possible, than 
their brethren of the House; or else, that the} 7- assumed the 
same suspicious position as to County interests with even 
more effrontery. The bill being under consideration, Mr. 
Miles, the Senator from St. Mary’s county, offered a long 
series of amendments, in the form of additional sections 
to the bill, embracing all the points sought to be protected 
by the amendments offered in the lower House, with the 
addition of one guarding against the re-establishment of the 
Lottery system and some others, of equally general ii* 
portance, though not directly touching County interests. 
There was a difference, however, in the manner in which 
these several propositions were presented by Mr. Miles, as 
will be gathered from the following, which is substantially 
one of his amendments : 

“Sec. —. And be it enacted, &c ., That it is the opinion of this 
General Assembly that the said Convention, if it shall assemble in 
pursuance of this Act, ought not to alter, amend or change any of those 
parts, articles or provisions of the existing Constitution and Bill of 
Rights which establish the relation of master and slave in this State.” 

The same form of words, tc it is the opinion of this General 
Assembly ” was used in all his other amendments, being 
applied to the basis of representation and to all the other 
subjects of the House amendments. So that the Senate was 
simply, by the amendments there offered, desired to express 
its opinion that such and such great county interests ought 
not to be meddled with. Yet, strange to say, all of Mn. 
Miles’s amendments were voted down by the majority! 
We have the less difficulty, therefore, in reaching the in¬ 
ference entitled to be drawn from this conduct on the part 


37 


of the majority of the Senate; for if they decline even to 
express an opinion that these questions ought not to he inter¬ 
fered with, it follows, as a matter of course, that they rather 
think their agitation ought to he renewed! 

There are a few points, however, touching the Senate's 
action that deserve a passing notice: 

1. When the reform bill reached the Senate, it was clogged 
with the slavery amendment that had been adopted in the 
House, which, it will be remembered, was a naked restriction 
on the convention, the House having rejected the sixth 
amendment that would have made it effective. This amend¬ 
ment was not stricken out by the Senate—and yet the 
majority rejected Mr. Miles’s amendment, declaring it their 
opinion that slavery ought not to be interfered with! An 
absurd contradiction, that is sufficiently suggestive without 
further comment. 

2. The pretence given in the Senate for not adopting the 
amendments offered, was the same that had been advanced 
in the House—the old story of a want of power to restrict 
the convention. Yet the Senate let pass the slavery restric¬ 
tion that the House had put in the bill, and is thus held 
responsible (provided the majority acted honestly!) to the 
same extent as has been developed in reference to the ma¬ 
jority in the House. Our deductions regarding the latter 
are thus equally applicable to the majority in the Senate. 
But it cannot be pretended that Mr. Miles’s amendments 
were restrictions cit all , because they only amounted to ex¬ 
pressions of opinion—and hence the position of the honorable 
Senators is even more defenceless, in this behalf, than that of 
their friends below! 

But this is not all. This extraordinary course of proceeding 
did not reach an end without one of the richest developments 
lately recorded in political annals. One of Mr. Miles s 
amendments, doubtless meant to act as a u dead-fall, was 
substantially as follows: 

«< Sec. — . And he it enacted , Ac. That in the opinion of this General 
Assembly, the Legislature cannot, by any limitations it may adopt, 
restrict the action of said Convention, if it shall assemble, &c. 

And strange to say, this proposition was negatived by the 
majority ! They thus affirmed, of course, that the legislature 
had the power to limit, and denied the truth of that very 
pretence which they had given for opposing the substantial 
amendments! Was ever any body of men so completely 
stultified by its own action ? 

The Senators thus having affirmed that the legislature 

” 3 * 


38 


could limit the convention, not only by this express vote, hut 
by their quiet assent to the slavery restriction of the House, 
a majority of them are thus put into the same position with 
the majority of the House, who practically affirmed the same 
proposition by adopting that restriction. The majority ot 
both bodies, therefore, stand upon the record, provided they 
have acted honestly , as having clearly asserted by their 
actions, that they could have adopted all the amendments, 
and rendered them effective, if they had chosen to do so. So 
we have at last arrived at the real point which was to be de¬ 
veloped by the foregoing examination of the record, and are 
obviously entitled to make the following affirmation : 

That, by their votes and actions, the majority in both the 
Senate and the House of Delegates clearly acknowledged 
that those great county interests, sought to be covered by 

THE AMENDMENTS, COULD HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN, BY LEGISLATIVE 
ACTION, FROM THE INTERFERENCE OF THE CONVENTION ; AND YET 
THAT THEY REFUSED TO ADOPT THE COURSE THAT WOULD HAVE SO 
WITHDRAWN THEM, AND WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THEIR BEING SUB¬ 
JECT TO CHANGE OR AMENDMENT ! 

IV. The inferences that can be drawn from all the forego¬ 
ing considerations, as to the probable real motives of our 
latter-day reformers, have been so often alluded to in the 
course of these observations, in their proper connections, and 
indeed will so readily suggest themselves from a detail of 
the facts whence they arise, that it is hardly possible, with¬ 
out repetition, to make a general statement of them at this 
point, as was originally proposed, and scarcely necessary so 
to do, except in very brief terms. We have before remarked, 
throughout the whole of this Reform agitation, the singular 
absence of any endeavor on the part of its friends to render 
any substantial reasons why the people of the State are in¬ 
terested in sustaining it; and it may be observed that they 
have been still more reserved and wary, if possible, in being 
betrayed into vouchsafing to outsiders the least glimpse of the 
particular objects which they have in view. Purposes they 
certainly wish to accomplish : but what those purposes are, 
is the Delphic mystery! Ever since the passage of the bill, 
its opponents among the people, and that portion of the 
press reflecting their views, have hardly been otherwise en¬ 
gaged than in crying aloud for light upon the secret designs 
of this important movement. But the oracle has remained 
silent, and its priestess is dumb—perhaps until after the 
election! Never a word have its apologists to answer, when 
questioned as to the particularly urgent reasons for this 
extraordinary Reform; while their speech is like the out- 


39 


pouring of the waters, when they hold forth on the “gener- 
alities^ of the question, or are allowed to smother the object 
in the glorification of the means , and to cover up all defi¬ 
ciencies by a heartfelt abuse of the Democratic party. This 
state of things, that has existed from the very first day on 
which the subject was broached in the Legislature until now, 
is itself sufficiently mysterious. We have surely a right to 
he suspicious of, and to distrust, the perfect rectitude and 
propriety of a movement, whose real purposes we cannot 
adequately become acquainted with. And we do not know 
that this foundation for suspicion, distrust and alarm, on 
the part of the people of the Counties, and especially those 
of the smaller Counties, is at all lessened by the following 
considerations: 

1. It is not altogether probable that, had the real designs 
of this movement been “ all right,” it would have been kept 
so long in the dark. As has been before stated, the question 
of reform was never agitated before the people, was never 
proclaimed by any political party, was never adopted by any 
candidate for office, and was not even discussed in the public 
journals. Yet, on the meeting of the Legislature, we find 
this movement all prepared, cut and dried, ready to be thrust 
upon the people. 

2. It may also he noted as somewhat singular that, in order 
to substantiate some pretence as a foundation for the legality 
of the movement, its leaders have seemingly consented to 
stand convicted, before the people, of the grossest inconsisten¬ 
cies of opinion, or else as miraculously swift converts to new 
theories of government For, as has been before noticed, the 
very men who now so extravagantly represent extreme and 
ultra Democratic—we had almost said Red-Republican— 
views of the legality of illegal changes, and the regularity 
of revolutionary reforms, are the same people who have all 
their lives been denouncing these very dogmas and every ap¬ 
proach to them 1 

3. The suddenness of the movement may also be profitably 
pondered on; and in connection therewith it might not be 
inappropriate again to advert to the fact of the extremely 
brief period allowed to elapse between the passage of the bill 
and the vote upon its provisions—barely two months being 
given to the people to consider so momentous a question; 
when an equal period at least is usually allowed to discuss 
the merits of a petty local contest, and thrice as long to weigh 
the issues of an ordinary State election! 

4. It might deserve to be also remembered that the Legis¬ 
lature refused altogether to agree to any standard, for the 


40 


purpose of testing whether an actual majority of the people 
desire the change—declined to adopt an amendment which 
would have made it incumbent on the reformers to show their 
real strength, hy taking the trouble to vote; and has thus put the 
issue in a position wherein, almost beyond peradventure, its 
decision is in the hands of the city of Baltimore, unless there 
should be a very remarkable effort made in the counties. 

5. We do not know that it will help at all to dispel these sus¬ 
picious circumstances from the minds of the people of the coun¬ 
ties to suggest, what is an undoubted fact, that the movement 
seems to have originated in the city of Baltimore, and unques¬ 
tionably proceeds from that quarter. It may be seriously doubted 
whether such a movement was even so much as dreamed of in 
any other part of the state. Which thing, seeing that Baltimore 
is about the only locality that can possibly gain by the operation, 
and that she is ripe and ready to adopt what pleases her and to 
reject what she does not approve, without regard to the feelings, 
rights or interests of any other portion of the State, is a pecu¬ 
liarly fine subject for the meditation of the people of the coun¬ 
ties—in the course of which they can fancy that great corporation 
sitting on the throne of power, the emblems of Maryland lying 
at its feet, the crown of her sovereignty on its brow, and her 
arms for its escutcheon, holding in its right hand the scourge that 
is all powerful even under existing laws, and just grasping wyth 
its left the legislative power itself; so that in future its will may 
be the Law! 

It is not pretended that these circumstances prove a case. It 
is not contended that they demonstrate definite objects. But, to 
a people who are disposed to regulate their conduct for the future 
by the bitter experience of the past, they probably form a little 
chain of singularities, that may prove a not unprofitable subject 
for a half-hour’s musings ! 

In the absence, therefore, of any reasons rendered for the move¬ 
ment, or of any definite or satisfactory disclosure of its purposes, 
it is probably fair to infer the latter, as nearly as we can, from the 
course of those with whom the movement originated. And 
hence, in the absence of any more reliable index, we are at 
liberty to regard the action of a majority in the Legislature as 
indicative of the sentiments of the bulk of those whom they 
represented, and as affording proper data for the formation of a 
judgment. What that judgment must be, in reference to the 
bearings of this movement upon county interests, is plain enough 
from the analysis heretofore gone through with. A majority of 
both houses has deliberately refused to guarantee against imme¬ 
diate unsettlement and confusion those exciting topics, that are 
of especial interest to the people of the counties, and have thus 


41 


practically given us to understand that agitation upon these topics 
is immediately to ensue—and has done this too, while acknowl¬ 
edging it could have been avoided. In a word, if there be any 
truth, reason or sense in men’s actions, the said majority, the 
leaders and originators of this reform movement, have made it as 
plain as it need be, that the present guarantees of slavery, the 
present basis of representation, the elective principle now in op¬ 
eration, the location of the seat of government, the protection of 
religious liberty now enjoyed, the absence of religious tests now 
happily secured, and other great and leading interests are to be 
re-opened for discussion and agitation, and to be made liable to a 
swift and thorough alteration; and, in indicating these purposes, 
they also practically and plainly acknowledge, as had been proved 
beyond doubt, that they could , if they had chosen so to do, have 
prevented these topics from being brought into the field of agita¬ 
tion at all. This is about the “ long and short” of the whole 
matter;'and we accept it as a fair statement of the issues now 
presented to the people of the counties, as to what we affirm to 
be the dangerous and threatening objects of this movement, in its 
relation to their interests. 

It has been intimated, in some quarters, that one of the real 
objects of reform is to change those features of the present Con¬ 
stitution which give the elective franchise to naturalized citizens 
of the United States, on certain conditions. Well, it is certainly 
a matter which the people of the State have the right to regulate 
for themselves ; and, like the whole question of suffrage, is to be 
determined and settled by each community for itself, upon con¬ 
siderations of policy and expediency. The franchise may be 
abused in the hands of naturalized citizens, just as it often is in 
those of the native born; the former may, under present restric¬ 
tions, be unfit to possess the suffrage, just as it .is evident, from 
the recent tone and style of our political conflicts, that many of 
those “ to the manor born ” are ignorant of its high privileges and 
unworthy of being entrusted with its exercise. But are the evils 
thus arising sufficient to justify a reform of the whole Constitu¬ 
tion? Outside the city of Baltimore, what is called the foreign 
vote never was large, and is now probably rather on the 
decrease ; while it is only laughable to think that, under the 
political theories that just now obtain within the limits of that 
corporation, the evils of alien suffrage can be very formidable 
there ! Can this much agitated question, then, be it ever so 
great, justify the excitement, expense, trouble, agitation, de¬ 
moralization and irregularity incident to a change of the Con¬ 
stitution, at this time and against all the forms of law? Is the 
disfranchisement of a few foreigners, even if it were necessary, 
just or politic, a sufficient reason why the whole subject of con- 


42 


stitutional reform should be opened up, and all the great interests 
we have mentioned be put in jeopardy ? Besides—if the only 
object had been to decrease the foreign vote for the future, why 
was not the contemplated reform confined to those clauses that grant 
the franchise*! Why was not the single issue of foreign suffrage 
submitted to the people, as a matter for reform? Certainly, the 
Legislature had the power to submit the question in this narrow 
form—aye! and the Legislature would so have submitted it, if it 
had intended that this reform should be confined to such a narrow 
compass! It is very convenient to put forward this hobby of 
Native-Americanism as the ostensible object to be attained ; and 
it is proving quite potent to lead in the train of these reformers 
not a few of the people of the counties, who follow blindly this 
jack-o’-lantern, seemingly regardless of the pits into which they 
will presently fall; and who may have cause, hereafter, to be 
troubled in spirit when, like the followers of Absalom, they shall 
hear the sound of the trumpets, and shall learn that their sceptre 
hath passed into the hands of a stranger! 

And it is further intimated, that another object of this move¬ 
ment is partisan aggrandizement; to make the Constitution 
square with the tenets of a political organization, dominant for 
the hour! As if the Constitution were a mere piece of state-craft 
or of political expediency, to be made the sporV of contending 
factions; or as if it ought not to rest high above that level on 
which parties and men may properly strive for the pride of opin¬ 
ion and the sweets of power! Into the terrible evils which must 
eventually result to the body politic, from the establishment of 
such a wild and unheard of precedent as this—a proposition 
which is wilder than all the mad schemes which political theorists 
have developed, and which overtops the highest line which the 
flood of fanaticism hath as yet marked upon the firm shores of 
political truth—it is hardly necessary that we should stop to ex¬ 
amine. To think of the Constitution as degraded to a condition 
in which it will be even less stable than a common act of Assem¬ 
bly, changeable at pleasure; to imagine it always on the political 
arena, as a theme for political discussion; to see proposed changes 
in its provisions made points in party platforms ; its stability de¬ 
stroyed, all reverence for it obliterated from the hearts of the peo¬ 
ple, its sanctity gone, and itself regularly changing as this or that 
party may succeed to power—is too appalling a prospect to en¬ 
gage the serious thoughts of any Maryland statesman or to afford 
agreeable contemplation to any Maryland patriot. Rather, let 
scorn be the reward of those who will dare to harbor such a pur¬ 
pose, and unsparing denunciation the only answer to the argu¬ 
ments that shall come to its support! 

I think, therefore, that these considerations are sufficient to 


43 


alarm the people of the counties, as to the purposes of this re¬ 
form, and to bring them closer together for self-protection; al¬ 
though each section of them may have its special fears. To the 
people of Western Maryland, the great elective principle of the 
present constitution and its general populai character ought to be 
dear, because they labored long and manfully for their accom¬ 
plishment; to the people of Southern Maryland, on the Western 
and Eastern Shores, the questions of slavery and of representa¬ 
tion are of paramount importance; to the whole of the last named 
shore other provisions of the same instrument, under existing cir¬ 
cumstances, are peculiarly necessary to be preserved ; while most 
of the other features of the Constitution are dear to us all alike, 
as contributing to our happiness and prosperity. That the people 
should be willing to jeopard these great interests irregularly, and 
in a manner contrary to their own predetermination, at any time, 
under any circumstances, would be not a little surprising. But it 
will indeed be a matter of surpassing astonishment, if they will 
allow this to be done when they have not authorized it; when 
they have not asked for it; when they have not been appealed to 
in relation to it; when no adequate cause exists why it should be 
done, and no adequate reason can be assigned lor proposing to 
do it; when the people who incite it are as few and obscure as 
the objects to be attained by it are dark and dangerous; when no 
sensible purpose for it is openly avowed, and the miserable pre¬ 
tences that leak out are sinister, selfish, dissentious and inimical 
to their best interests ; when, as is evident, the whole movement 
can in no otherwise be properly denominated than as an unworthy 
and treacherous CONSPIRACY, that has trampled on the reserved 
rights of the sovereignty in its inception, and will disregard the 
settled interests of communities in its results; and when, to cap 
the climax of the absurd iniquity, the whole endeavor is the work 
of a few restless Demagogues, who, having no stake in the per¬ 
manency of public interests, and no care for the security of pri¬ 
vate rights, are ever willing to wreak their revenge for the just 
hatred of mankind by their efforts to unsettle all that a patriot 
would make stable, to desecrate all that a good citizen would 
hold in veneration, to frustrate all that a statesman would render 
serviceable, by perpetually tampering with the foundations of the 
government. From the dominion of such pests of society may 
God deliver our good old Commonwealth of Maryland, and pro¬ 
tect her people from the snares of all such destroyers; that her 
institutions and her laws, and the spirit of her people, may be 
blessed, in the future, for the civil and religious liberty they shall 
hand down from the past! 

I have thus, sir, in compliance with your request, set down in 
a general way, the considerations upon which this Reform move- 


44 


c 


ment was resisted by myself and by others in the late Legislature; 
as well as those inferences, drawn from the circumstances attending 
the passage of the measure, and other facts, which seem to warrant 
opposition to it as the safer path for the people of the counties. 
They are such as, if developed, would not only cause them to 
vote against the convention, but to take care, in eveiy portion ot 
the state, if it shall be called, that its control shall not lie in the 
hands of those who have thus usurped the powers of the people 
to compromise the people’s interests and welfare. You will 
appreciate the imperfection with which these views ha\e been 
presented, and you will know how to pardon such part of it as 
may be attributable to the necessary haste in which they have 
been thrown together. I remain, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

L.of C. EDWARD W. BELT, 


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